Scalar Interactions in the Mekong River Basin:
Dam Incentives and Outcomes

Abstract: The Mekong River plays an intricate and dynamic role in the environmental,
social, economic, and cultural systems of the 70 million people throughout its basin and
the more than 300 million people in the six Mekong nations. The river is both a necessity
for millions of individuals with livelihoods centered on its resources and, in the eyes of
large-scale actors, a tool for regional development and industrialization. Policies
throughout the Mekong River Basin have long dealt with international issues and often
center on large-scale outcomes, such as the promotion of regional economic development
and intergovernmental cooperation, but have neglected to account for inter-scalar
relationships and the impacts of hydro-development on small-scale actors and processes.
The continued promotion of dams throughout the Mekong River Basin is exemplary of
the emphasis on transboundary issues at the expense of small-scale actors.
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Introduction:
No irony exists in the Thai name Mae Naam Kong (Mother River) for the Mekong
River. As it snakes through six southeastern Asian nations, the Mekong River provides
life sources for all levels, scales, and types of interactions throughout its basin, causing
many nations to consider the river to be a mother, or giver of life. Unlike the situations in
most developing and industrializing regions, the Mekong River’s resources and heritage
continue to define many aspects of southeastern Asia. Despite of—or possibly as a result
of—the ample natural resources within the region, the Mekong River Basin has
historically been a region ripe with strife, unrest, and poverty. The Mekong River’s
transboundary governing body, the Mekong River Commission, promotes
industrialization strategies centered on large water development projects for the benefit of
the region as a whole. Such projects often cause conflict between scales as natural
resources previously utilized for subsistence and agriculture purposes become geared
toward new, often competing, purposes and tradeoffs must be made between competing
users. The drivers for development transcend boundaries in a similar manner to the
transboundary impacts of the dams themselves. Understanding and analyzing the scales
of interactions concerning Mekong River governance, therefore, are integral to the
continued functioning of the region for the benefit of all who rely on the Mekong River.

Literature Review:
Political Ecology:
Political ecology is a field in which intersections between politics, ecology, and
society emerge, and thus serves as a framework through which to view the construction
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of dams and their effects on the economies, biological communities, and peoples
surrounding them. According to political ecologists Watts and Peet (2004), political
ecology is a “confluence between ecologically rooted social science and the principles of
political economy” (Peet and Watts 2004, 444). Watts and Peet argue for the creation of
a more just society through understanding the movements that emerge from clashes
between players in a political economy, such as politics, natural resources, and cultures
(Peet and Watts 2004, 444).
According to Robbins (2004), political ecologists “seek to expose flaws in
dominant approaches to the environment favored by corporate, state, and international
authorities, working to demonstrate the undesirable impacts of policies and market
conditions, especially from the point of view of local people, marginal groups, and
vulnerable populations” (Robbins 2004, 3-16). Geographers Brown and Purcell,
however, argue against the assumption that the use of the local scale for organization,
policies, and action leads to more beneficial outcomes for the majority of those affected
(Brown and Purcell 2005, 607-624). Brown and Purcell assert scale has no inherent
benefits and should be considered a strategy to see through a specific agenda, just like
any other strategy, rather than a cause of a particular outcome (Brown and Purcell 2005,
607-624). They assert that many political geographers fall prey to the “local trap,” in
which they assume the devolution of power to local scale actors will inherently lead to
the desired outcomes of political ecologists, such as democracy, social justice, and
environmental sustainability (Brown and Purcell 2005, 607-624). This analysis will
utilize political ecology perspectives to investigate scalar relationships between
transnational and local scales through a case study of the Mekong River.
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Scale:
Scale plays a large role in political ecology and holds much significance to the
analysis of transboundary dams along the Mekong River. Marston (2000) contends scale,
while a contested and multifaceted concept, is becoming widely accepted as a result of
social construction and should be considered a relational, rather than fixed, concept
inclusive of size and level. Likewise, Brenner (2001) asserts studies of scale necessitate
an understanding of the social construction of scale and its resulting usefulness for
comparing relationships between scales but not for analyzing isolated scales. According
to Neumann (2009), the politics of scale is a theorization that incorporates three key
concepts; namely, scale is socially constructed, historically contingent, and politically
contested (Neumann 2009, 398-406). Marston et al. (2005) identify three problems with
politics of scale theorization, including the confusion between scale (size) and level
(hierarchy), the local/global binary that assumes inherent differences between scales
without a proper analysis of either, and the presupposition of fixed scales. This analysis
will make extensive use of the concept of scale to assess incentives for and implications
of dams along the Mekong River and the associations with power at different scales.

Geography:
The Mekong River, which snakes through the six Asian nations of China,
Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia, makes geography another
powerful perspective through which to analyze the construction of dams along the
Mekong River. The Mekong crosses international borders, creates international borders,
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and spans numerous biomes and land types (Figure 1). Geography’s encapsulation of
physical and social relationships, and its emphasis on understanding the roles of
marginalized groups, enables it to be a strong lens through which to view the social and
cultural impacts arising from the construction of transboundary dams.

Figure 1: The Mekong River flows through six
countries in southeastern Asia
(http://www.taiwandna.com/MalayMekongMigration.jpg)

International Waterway Governance:
Governance of international waterways is an issue of great importance. Roughly
263 of the world’s rivers span more than one country or create a border between two or
more countries (Gerlak 2004, 108--141). These rivers hold the majority of the world’s
fresh water and provide resources and livelihoods to billions of people; hence, changes to
international river ecosystems impact millions of people and entire civilizations.
According to environmental scientist Gerlak (2004), international regimes for the
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governance of international waterways play three important roles; they increase the
concern of the government for the issues at stake, they promote the legal frameworks and
nations’ abilities to uphold regulations, and they enhance the capacities within nations to
promote proper governance of the waterways (Gerlak 2004, 108-141). As such, they play
an integral role in asserting the importance of the waters within separate nations. They,
furthermore, have the potential to reduce or avoid conflict where access to resources
creates contention.

Dams:
The two primary types of dams, hydroelectric and irrigation, cause immense
environmental, livelihood, and cultural impacts within areas adjacent to the dams and
their reservoirs. Irrigation dams create reservoirs to store water for increased flow during
dry seasons. Hydroelectric dams may be reservoir dams or run-of-the-river dams.
Reservoirs of large irrigation dams can cause inundation of thousands of kilometers of
land. The increased pressure on the land from reservoirs often causes leaching of
minerals previously trapped below the surface, such as salt in northeastern Thailand
(Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204). Both reservoir dams and run-of-the-river dams divide
the river into two sections that most migratory fish species are unable to bridge, even
with mitigation measures such as fish ladders (Sokhem, Sunada, and Oishi 2007, 503523). Because most migratory fish species rely on their migrations to spawn, an inability
to travel the rivers leads to severe harm to—or even depletion of—fish species (Baran
and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234). Dams reduce seasonal floods, which generally
provide cues that trigger many fish species to migrate and replenish nutrients essential to
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many biological communities, including fish (Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234).
The creation of reservoirs, loss of seasonal floods, and restriction of fish migrations
greatly alter the physical environment, which, in turn causes many changes for local
communities.
Effects of dams are especially drastic for communities reliant on natural
resources. Dam reservoirs often reduce water availability for paddy irrigation to
communities near the dam and reduce the availability of land for livestock grazing, both
of which cause livelihood changes and often the displacement and resettlement of local
communities (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204). Moreover, salinization caused by
reservoirs makes agriculture and rice paddy cultivation impossible, which is ironic given
the purpose of many dams in the region is dry-season rice farming (Molle and Floch
2008, 199-204). Studies by Tilt et al. (2009) concluded the reduction of natural resources
for subsistence use or sale leads to changes in rural economies because villagers must
enter mainstream market economies whereas they were previously able to produce and
trade on a more informal basis within their communities (Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249S257).
Dams cause changes in social and cultural attributes of regions, as well. Dams
have been known to cause changes in gender relations because compensation for losses is
systematically given to men, which elevates them above the status of their wives (Tilt,
Braun, and He 2009, S249-S257). Furthermore, when dams cause drastic changes to the
lifestyles and resources of communities, they affect local customs and cultural attributes,
such as those dependent on specific natural resources (Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249S257). Thus, the impacts of dams on local communities range from social to economic
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and ecological, all of which integrate to create massive changes to the lives and cultures
of dam-affected communities.
The demands for hydropower development encourage inaccurate and improper
analyses of the environmental and social impacts of the projects in the name of haste
(Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234). Thus, secrecy
becomes ingrained in hydropower development and the public is not made aware of the
plans for development (Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234). It is commonplace for
entire villages living near the sites of large proposed dams to remain largely unaware of
plans for dam construction or the possible implications on their homes and livelihoods
throughout the entire planning stages of dams (personal observation). Villagers often
hear conflicting stories from academics, NGOs, government officials, and dam planners,
leading to greater confusion and even internal village conflict regarding the potential
dams (personal observations). Environmental impact assessments (EIAs), social impact
assessments (SIAs), and public hearings—all of which are meant to incorporate local
participation—often become token actions without legitimate goals or outcomes (Molle
and Floch 2008, 199-204, Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249-S257).

Methods:
Research for this analysis consists primarily of archival and document research.
Other sources of research include the personal experiences and observations of villagers,
researchers, and NGOs in Isaan, the northeastern region of Thailand, along the Lao-Thai
border of the Mekong River in August through December of 2008 (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Isaan, the northeastern region of Thailand (in
red), is known for its flat terrain, endless rice paddies,
and the subsistence resource use, poverty, and rich
Laotian culture of the Isaan people
(http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thailand Isan.png)

Background:
With a length of 4800 kilometers, the Mekong River is the 11th longest river in the
world and the 12th largest by volume(Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202). The Upper
Mekong River, between China and Myanmar, holds three dams, but the Lower Mekong
River, which is situated in the countries of Thailand, Lao PDR, and Cambodia, is the
longest free-flowing stretch of international waterway in the world (Sokhem and Sunada
2008, 219-224). The Mekong River Basin provides refuge for over 70 million residents
and the river itself provides livelihoods or means of subsistence for the vast majority of
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individuals living along it (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202, Sokhem and Sunada 2008,
219-224). Located in southeastern Asia, the Mekong River Basin is composed of a
diversity of land, vegetation, and soil types. The basin contains forested mountains,
scrublands, and rice paddy areas, which provide a vast array of resource-based
livelihoods (Figure 3). The river and surrounding basin are characterized by annual
flooding, which brings nutrients, fisheries, and areas for agricultural production (Sneddon
and Fox 2006, 181-202).

Figure 3: The Mekong River Basin is composed of a
diversity of land, vegetation, and soil types.
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/visioning-flowingwaters-from-laos-to-cambodia/
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Roughly 600 kilometers of the Mekong River lie along national borders and much
of this is between Thailand and Laos. Because civilizations have historically lived along
the riverbanks of the Mekong River and crossed the river regularly and with ease, the
Mekong is not a border that strictly divides populations (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181202). For instance, the people of Northeastern Thailand are culturally and genetically
more closely tied with Laotians than they are with populations from other regions within
Thailand. Peoples on all sides of the river tend to be dependent on agrarian and fishery
livelihoods, which keeps them culturally, socially, and economically tied to each other
and the watersheds in which they live.
The organizational bodies currently responsible for transboundary governance of
the Greater Mekong Subregion are the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program and
the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The GMS Program is an Asian Development
Bank-supported initiative in place to foster economic liberalization and regional
integration within the nations of the Greater Mekong Subregion (Badenoch 2002, 1-33)
whereas the MRC is a body created to carry out the vision of the 1995 Mekong
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River
Basin. The 1995 Mekong Agreement’s mission was to “achieve optimum use and
prevention of waste of the waters in accordance with the aim of improving the livelihood
of the people living within the Lower Mekong River Basin” (Ma et al. 2008, 1069-1087).
As a means of achieving this goal, the MRC originally re-envisioned the Mekong River
as a battery for hydropower development to power the Mekong River Basin , but has
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since shifted to a stronger emphasis on “fair and equitable utilization” of the river’s
resources (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202, Badenoch 2002, 1-33).
Badenoch (2002) claims “there is no institutional framework for accountability
among the nations of the basin,” which presents an absolute weakness of basin
governance. The MRC includes only nations in the Lower Mekong Subregion, such as
Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. China and Myanmar are not official
members of the MRC, but act as dialogue partners for some crucial issues (Badenoch
2002, 1-33). The MRC is making strides toward integration as depicted by its expression
of concern over development strategies in China that would impact nations downriver of
China (Badenoch 2002, 1-33). Badenoch (2002) believes the incorporation of China and
Myanmar into the MRC would be a step toward basin-wide accountability.
Sokhem et al. present the Mekong River Basin (MRB) as a rare example of a
major international river basin capable of promoting cooperation throughout the region in
the interest of sustainable development and stability. They assert, however, this is
possible if, and only if, management effectively distributes costs and benefits associated
with the water resources (Sokhem, Sunada, and Oishi 2007, 503-523). Many “Mekong
commentators” question the ability of the current organizations overseeing Mekong
activities to solve transboundary conflicts and even wonder whether some conflicts are a
result of the poor governance stemming from said organizations (Sokhem, Sunada, and
Oishi 2007, 503-523) Therefore, the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the primary
organization responsible for the management of the Lower Mekong Basin, must uphold
strong mechanisms for regulating and creating cooperation between states and must,
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themselves, remain focused on the range of impacts of development projects so that the
needs of all stakeholders are represented (Sokhem, Sunada, and Oishi 2007, 503-523).
The GMS Program claims poverty alleviation is a primary goal of many of its
development initiatives, but some commentators assert the “neoliberal development
trajectory driving the GMS Program has left behind an unacceptably large portion of
society” (Badenoch 2002, 1-33). The lack of clear incentives driving the GMS Program
and the failure of the MRC to incorporate all involved nations support the assertion of
some commentators that current Mekong River institutions and organizations are illequipped to manage problems associated with Mekong River governance (Sokhem,
Sunada, and Oishi 2007, 503-523).
Consensus does not exist as to what form of governance over transboundary
waterways is most effective for the diversity of stakeholders involved. Governance of the
Mekong River Basin is recognized for the dominance of national governments and
official processes in all of its governing bodies, but scale of governance still enters the
issue in other ways Some argue for national governments to remain the primary voices,
such as in the MRC, because of their direct linkages with government interactions.
Others argue for a more regional approach, such as that taken by the GMS Program,
which has positive attributes such as the inclusion of southern China, the promotion of
regional integration, and the support for non-governmental interactions Still others argue
for the efficacy of a more diverse range of actors by integrating many forms of
governance so that multiple perspectives and agendas are represented (Badenoch 2002, 1-33). Badenoch (2002) asserts that the level of governance and decision-making should
be chosen so that the largest number of stakeholders is represented and so that levels of
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governance are encouraged to interact. Thus, governance decisions that involve players
at various levels should be carried out at scales large enough to incorporate the interests
of large-scale actors but not so large that the voices of small-scale actors are silenced.
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a leading multilateral organization for
the promotion of cooperation around international waters. As such, GEF promotes and
supports activities to encourage participation from numerous countries on issues of water
that cross national borders. Gerlack’s analysis of GEF’s international water activities
leads to the conclusion that organizations such as GEF may play primarily a catalytic role
in the creation of activities for collaboration on transboundary water resources with the
hope that momentum becomes reality once they leave the projects in the hands of more
local bodies. Gerlack concludes that organizations for the governance of transboundary
waters are more likely to be effective if their solutions are in the form of “site-specific,
regional cooperative efforts” (Gerlak 2004, 108-141). Thus, Gerlack asserts the opinion
that international water initiatives are most likely to create beneficial outcomes when they
are carried out at a fairly small scale and with the ability to tailor projects to the sites and
situations.
The Mekong River Basin is known for poverty, but also for the vast utilization of
natural resources from within the basin for subsistence and livelihood generation. The
GMS has 40 million people whose livelihoods and means of subsistence are derived at
least partially from the natural resources provided by Mekong capture fisheries (Sneddon
and Fox 2006, 181-202). Millions more individuals are dependent on other resources
within the basin, such as rice paddy cultivation and riverbank agriculture. Because of the
heavy dependence on natural resources, the use of income levels to determine poverty
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rankings is inaccurate for regions such as the Mekong River Basin because income is not
equivalent to the ability to meet basic needs (Varis 2008, 225-231). Without interference
by dams and other development projects that affect the availability of natural resources,
the people of the Mekong River Basin are largely able to survive comfortably with
incomes under the poverty level. “We are not rich, but we have abundant food” said
Pitpibul Lakhonwong, deputy headman of Thalong village in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand
(Thai press reports, corruption 2008). Lakhonwong expresses the general atmosphere in
many rural villages throughout the Mekong Basin. Field observations throughout rural
Thailand indicated villagers are tightly knit and provide for each other on a regular basis,
thus reducing the necessity for economic wealth.
Poverty alleviation, along with economic growth and environmental
sustainability, was one of the three initial goals of the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which
continues to govern activities along the Mekong River (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202).
Water resources specialist Varis (2008) points out the existence of a positive relationship
between economic development and poverty alleviation due to the trickle down effect of
funds entering the country through development projects. He takes the issue one step
further, however, to bring to light the growing economic disparity that often comes with
economic development. According to the Kuznets theory, economic development causes
greater income disparities between the wealthy and poor until a middle class is reached,
at which point the disparity begins to decrease (Varis 2008, 225-231).
The contradiction between intended poverty alleviation and the actual increase in
occurrence of poverty is often caused by poorly planned economic growth and poor
governance. For instance, dams create extensive environmental impacts and eliminate
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many natural resources subsistence-based peoples depend upon, such as fish, nutrientrich river banks for agriculture, natural resource-rich wetlands, and unsalinated rice
paddies(Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234, Tilt,
Braun, and He 2009, S249-S257). The removal of resources upon which they depend
truly impoverishes them because it removes their abilities to meet their basic needs, such
as nutrient intakes. A lack of natural resource availability for subsistence-based people
forces them to incorporate themselves into the market economy where their lack of
substantial incomes forces many into the sort of poverty in which they are unable to meet
their basic needs (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Varis 2008, 225-231).

Discussion:
Lebel (2005) argues trans-boundary impacts of water diversion and storage are
the most crucial issues associated with politics of position within the Mekong region.
China, as the northernmost nation associated with the Mekong River, holds the majority
of the river’s headwaters and its plans to heavily dam the river promise to have severe
impacts on downstream communities and Mekong nations (Lebel, Garden, and Imamura
2005). In 2004 following construction of the Dachaoshan hydroelectric dam in the
Yunnan province of China, downstream communities began to experience low and
abnormal flows in the Mekong. This example of unjust access to resources is an issue of
great importance to downstream nations. Therefore, the MRC was asked to step in and
convene regarding the issue of reduced flow from the Dachaoshan dam (Lebel, Garden,
and Imamura 2005). The MRC took on the role of mediating transboundary water
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resources between Mekong nations, but mediating resource uses between scales within
Mekong nations remains largely uncoordinated (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202).
Ban Koum Dam, a planned dam along the Mekong River between the Lao PDR
and Thailand, is exemplary of the conflict between large-scale incentives for hydropower
development and the powerlessness of smaller scales to effect change in the development
plans so they do not become the future victims of the environmental and social costs of
dams. Ban Koum Dam will serve as a case study for this analysis of the incentives for
and implications of dams in the Mekong River Basin at various scales.
Dams are constructed to serve the needs of parties that promote them, possibly in
contrast to stated incentives for dams. Governments and large-scale stakeholders claim
to promote dam construction for a variety of purposes, including benefits at the
international, national, and local levels. Zoologist and environment and development
researcher Lebel (2005), however, points out stories and propaganda—which need not be
factual—can be used by politicians and other stakeholders to promote their interests. For
instance, in 2004 bureaucrats and politicians in Thailand spread stories of the existence of
a drought just days before they began to promote their new plans for water infrastructure
development to minimize the effects of future droughts (Lebel, Garden, and Imamura
2005, ). The lack of a true drought during that time is evidence to the ability of
politicians to use their positions to promote personal interests without being held
accountable to information not based on fact. Dam promoters claim dams bring regional
integration and economic prosperity, both of which they assert will support national
interests and trickle down to local communities to alleviate poverty(Molle and Floch
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2008, 199-204, Badenoch 2002, 1--33), but this is a contested outcome of dam
construction in the Mekong region as will be explored in the following analysis.

Local scale benefits:
One of the most prominently stated goals of Mekong dam construction is to bring
development to regions for the purpose of poverty alleviation and increased livelihood
opportunities, especially through irrigation (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Sneddon
and Fox 2006, 181-202, Badenoch 2002, 1-33). For instance, as early as the mid 1900s,
Thailand determined its path for “stimulating the modernization of Isaan,” which holds
the highest poverty rates of any portion of Thailand, was through development of its
water resources (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204). Since then, Thailand has progressed
through many attempts to create large-scale hydroproject development in Isaan, largely
in the form of irrigation dams to increase dry-season flow to areas within the region so as
to provide livelihood opportunities to small-scale farmers during the dry season when
Isaan is too dry for most forms of agriculture (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204).
The attempts of dams to create effective irrigation for farmers, however, have
created few benefits if any at all. In 2004 the MRC carried out modeling of the effects of
four Chinese dams and six Laotian dams on river flow. These models depicted a
reduction of flow below even the standard deviation of wet and dry years, indicating the
ineffectiveness of the dams to increase flow and reliability (Sokhem and Sunada 2008,
219-224). Along a similar vein, a study on the effects of Manwan Dam along the
Lancang River (China’s name for the Mekong River) in southern China found some
downstream areas received an increase in dry-season flow, but areas surrounding the
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reservoir experienced a significant decrease in the proportion of irrigated fields to nonirrigated fields following dam construction (Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249-S257).
Thus, the tradeoff for increasing downstream dry-season flow appeared to be a decrease
in year-round agriculture in nearby areas, indicating the attempt to increase dry-season
flow was inefficient and ineffective.
One of the main purposes of increasing irrigation for agriculture is to provide
farmers with the ability to dry-season rice farm; the contradiction presented by dams
meant for dry-season rice farming, however, is the lack of dry-season rice farming that
actually occurs as a result of dams. Because 65 percent of Mekong diets is provided by
cereals rice and wheat, dry-season rice farming is assumed to increase the amount of food
available to Mekong River Basin families and increase their incomes through the sale of
excess rice (Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249-S257, Sokhem and Sunada 2008, 219-224).
In the study on Manwan Dam in China, the loss of the most highly valued land type
(irrigated rice paddies) following the construction of the dam and its reservoir forced
many farmers to turn from rice paddy cultivation to other dryland crops, such as maize
and sugarcane. These are not, however, staples to their diets, so they began to trade
maize and sugarcane for rice to feed their families (Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249S257). As is apparent from the examples, dams built for irrigation purposes have not led
to decreases in poverty of those in the basin and have even, in many cases, increased
poverty levels by reducing the availability of irrigated land.

National and transboundary benefits:
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As indicated by the evidence suggesting poverty-alleviation measures of dams are
ineffective, the continued promotion of dams signifies dam-promoters have other
incentives behind their construction. Governments and state-wide actors promote dams
because dams serve their economic and political interests, whether or not these are stated
on the record. Large dams are in the best interests of national governments and largescale actors within the state because they bring economic and political gains to the region
through industrialization (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181202). Hydroelectric and irrigation schemes bring money to government sectors
promoting dam projects, development banks financing large projects, and industries able
to capitalize on the electricity from dams (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204). Nations of
the lower Mekong basin are rich with natural resources but currently lack the
industrialization and infrastructure necessary to become powerful players in international
markets(Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202). In order to industrialize effectively and
become players in the international markets, Mekong nations are in need of large
amounts of cheap energy, which dams can provide.
Ban Koum Dam is expected to produce 1,872 megawatts of electricity and
inundate 84,000 rai of farmland in Thailand alone (Anonymous 2008). Thailand will
receive the energy from the dam and Laos will receive an economic boost from the sale
of the energy, both of which fall nicely into the nations’ plans to develop the hydropower
potential of the Mekong River to aid in each country’s competitiveness in international
markets (Anonymous 2008).
In addition to bringing economic and political benefits to governments and largescale actors, industrialization in the Mekong River Basin is also claimed to secure
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increased livelihood opportunities and reduce the incidence of poverty for the people of
the Lower Mekong nations; however, evidence suggests this is not effective (Badenoch
2002, 1-33). Massive local opposition to dams in Thailand and throughout the Mekong
River Basin continues to arise because of the social and economic strife they cause for
local communities. Pak Mun Dam and Rasi Salai Dam in Isaan, Thailand are two
examples of dams that have caused the relocation and loss of livelihood for thousands of
individuals and continue to be protested more than two decades after their construction
(Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202). The Water Resources Institute’s Transboundary
Environmental Governance report finds “marginalized communities are missing out on
the benefits of economic development, even as they confront massive structural and
political barriers to their more active participation in planning and implementing the
strategies that are meant to help them” (Badenoch 2002, 1-33). As depicted, the
economic and political gains brought to nations and their large-scale stakeholders are not
dispersed throughout scales and, thus, small-scale actors remain losers in the analysis of
the impacts of dam projects, which further indicates the inequity created when large-scale
actors drive dam development with little thought to their impacts at other scales.
The ineffectiveness of poverty-reduction measures and coinciding benefits of
dams to large-scale actors in the Mekong River Basin further imbalance power held
between the various scales at play in transboundary water development strategies. In the
process of bringing development to the Greater Mekong Subregion, tradeoffs in Mekong
nations are made between the economies, rural livelihoods, and food securities of each
nation (Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234). With the governance decisions in the
hands of large-scale actors, the trade-offs are made in support of governments and
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statewide actors often to the detriment of small-scale actors whose rights are further
impeded by the imposition of the dams.

Large-scale benefits at the expense of small-scale actors:
Geographer Sneddon (2006) argues the goal held by large-scale organizations and
governments in control of the Mekong basin to make the Mekong an “engine of regional
development” trumps any and all efforts to incorporate small-scale actors into the
development of the projects and their implementation. Lebel (2005) indicates the highest
priority for electricity and irrigation from dams is given to urban centers and high
economic value sectors to drive national development. For instance, in Thailand the
hierarchy of where benefits from dams are distributed extends first to Bangkok in the
form of water, then to other sectors, with rice in rural Thailand receiving the last share of
benefits from the dams (Lebel, Garden, and Imamura 2005). Thus, the priority list in
which economic gains of national and regional actors are given precedence over poverty
reduction of small-scale actors provides evidence development projects aim first and
foremost to support large-scale interests (Badenoch 2002, 1-33).
The promotion of production-based systems in the Lower Mekong region is an
example of the supremacy of the interests of national stakeholders to the needs of smallscale actors in governmental actions. Bush (2008) provides many examples of evidence
for the need to protect capture fisheries and other natural resources for the subsistence of
local populations in the Mekong region. Regardless of these examples, however,
governance continues to be centered on production-based systems, such as forestry,
livestock, and crop production, instead of natural resources and capture fisheries (Bush
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2008, 329-353). The sale of these products provides a transboundary benefit to national
actors because they bring revenue to the region. Transnational actors encourage their
production because overall demand for goods from the Mekong River basin is high
(Sokhem, Sunada, and Oishi 2007, 503-523); thus, export of Mekong resources brings
market power to the region as a whole.
An emphasis on such production-based systems at the expense of natural
resources serves to undermine the subsistence potential of local resource-users, and
further marginalizes the local populations who are unable or unwilling to effectively enter
market economies with production-based resources(Bush 2008, 329-353). The
marginalization of small-scale actors that results from such transboundary efforts further
disempowers those in the margins from controlling their means of subsistence and
livelihood. As such, the needs of locals continue to be compromised for the sake of
transboundary water development agendas, specifically dams.
The Lao PDR’s economic shift in the 1980s is yet another example of a change in
national policy to the benefit of large-scale development and the cost of locals. Lao PDR
changed its economic development agenda in the early 1980s from an agriculture- and
subsistence-based economy to an industrializing economy (Bush 2008, 329-353). This
shift coincided with a stronger emphasis on dam construction and was claimed to be a
solution to Laos’ “food problem” (Bush 2008, 329-353). As demonstrated previously,
however, dams remove natural resources used for subsistence by local people and
therefore reduce food available to locals. Laos’ shift to industrialization through the
construction of dams exemplifies a national agenda that further disempowered locals
rather than solving the food problem Laos claimed to intend to solve with the shift.
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The large-scale demands for hydropower development encourage inaccurate and
improper analyses of the environmental and social impacts of the projects in the name of
haste (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234). In
attempts to spur hydropower development and reduce opposition, secrecy becomes
engrained in dam promotion and the public is not made aware of hydroproject plans
(Baran and Myschowoda 2009, 227-234). Environmental impact assessments (EIAs),
social impact assessments (SIAs), and public hearings—all of which are meant to
incorporate local participation—often become token actions without legitimate goals or
outcomes (Molle and Floch 2008, 199-204, Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, S249-S257).
Field observation along the Thai side of the Mekong River near the proposed site
of Ban Koum Dam in late 2008 indicated villagers knew very little about the dam and
had heard differing plans from dam builders, government agencies, academics, and
NGOs. Dam builders entered the villages with promises to bring tourism and other
livelihoods to the region and neglected to educate villagers on the environmental impacts
of the proposed dam, including a loss of the natural resources most villagers rely upon.
Academics and NGOs, in contrast, entered the villages to begin to educate villagers on
the destructive effects of similar dams in the region, such as the controversial Pak Mun
dam and the likely effects Ban Koum would have on their lives. Local conflict was
beginning to brew between individuals skeptical of the dam and those in support of the
opportunities they have been told the dam will bring.
The legitimacy of dam promoters’ incentives for Ban Koum Dam is questionable
due to suspicious activities surrounding its planning and implementation. According to
the Thai Press, “the signing of the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] bypassed
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parliamentary approval and the government had failed to take into account public
participation, particularly villagers affected by the dam construction” (Anonymous 2008).
Moreover, the Lao and Thai governments agreed to allow Italian-Thai Development Plc
(ITD) to complete the feasibility study for the dam without following the correct
procedures for making such a decision (Anonymous 2008). ITD’s promise to complete
the study free of charge further raises suspicion (Anonymous 2008). Overall, the illegal
and questionable actions of the Lao and Thai governments and other dam-promoting
agencies to set the dam in motion suggest the large national benefits expected from the
dam. These actions, however, are being taken at the expense of the local people, whose
voices are being muted in the dam’s planning stages for the sake of a speedy transition to
the dam’s implementation.

Conflict reduction and associated scalar contradiction:
A not yet aforementioned incentive for dam construction in the Mekong River
Basin is the reduction of conflict through cooperation between Mekong nations. A goal
of the MRC is to create sustained cooperation between nations through equitable access
to resources in the Mekong basin (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202). Throughout the
Cold War, the development of large hydroprojects along the Mekong River was
encouraged as a means of securing cooperation between Mekong nations and this same
tactic is still used(Sneddon and Fox 2006, 181-202). The construction of Ban Koum
Dam, from which Laos will receive money from electricity generation and Thailand will
receive generated electricity for Isaan, its northeastern region, depicts an example the
benefits of cooperation among nations through hydropower development.
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The hydropower development goal of cooperation between Mekong nations,
however, brings to light a contradiction inherent to large development projects. The
emphasis on large-scale benefits from dams leads to a neglect of the negative impacts of
the dams on environmental, social, and cultural systems. Dams create socioecological
losses for wetland ecosystems, a reduction in rice paddy cultivation dependent on
seasonal flood patterns, and a loss of capture fisheries among other impacts (Tilt, Braun,
and He 2009, S249-S257). The reduction of each of these natural resources causes
poverty and social conflict over remaining resources mostly at the local level, but also
across national borders (Sneddon and Fox 2007, 2161-2181). Therefore, conflict over
natural resources results from the construction of dams that were ironically meant to elicit
peace and cooperation between nations.

Conclusion:
Dams within the Mekong River Basin are promoted at the national and
international levels for a variety of purposes involving local, regional, state, and
transboundary actors. The continued promotion of large dams despite evidence for the
ineffectiveness of most poverty-alleviation goals of dams indicates the existence of
strong incentives for dams from other stakeholders. Large-scale stakeholders and
governments of Mekong nations appear to promote dams primarily to spur
industrialization and economic development throughout the basin. As dams continue to
be built to serve the interests of large-scale transboundary actors, the costs of such
development initiatives continue to be borne by small-scale actors, especially local
people dependent on the resources provided by the river.
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The Lower Mekong River is currently the longest stretch of free-flowing water in
the world, but plans are in the works for numerous Mekong dams in the next couple of
decades (Figure 4). Conflicting data exists for the number of Mekong dams in planning
stages, but higher estimates suggest the planning of 20 large dams in the Lower Mekong
Basin alone and many more throughout the entire length of the Mekong River (Ghosh
and Correspondent 2010, ). As depicted through the analysis above, even a single dam
creates drastic consequences within the environmental, social, and economic realms of
the Mekong River Basin. Dam construction follows a cyclical pattern because the
construction of dams lead to the loss of pertinent resources for subsistence and resourcebased livelihoods, which often further disempowers locals from the ability to voice their
concerns and enact change in development patterns. As such, it is of the utmost
importance to generate a better understanding of the scalar relationships within the
Mekong River Basin and the incentives for and impacts of future dams before dam
construction along the Mekong River sets a precedent for the creation of environmental,
social, and economic unrest at the small scales for the sake of large-scale actors.
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Figure 4: The Mekong River Basin and its
associated dams in all stages of operation and
planning
(http://www.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/great
ermekong/challenges_in_the_greater_mekong/infrastructur
e_development_in_the_greater_mekong/)
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